As a Traveler, Why Should You Be Concerned About Espionage?

First, your employment with a cleared defense contractor (CDC) gives you actual and/or potential access to information of value to foreign governments. Foreign intelligence services will perceive you this way, whether you agree or not.  Second, when you travel, you are most vulnerable to the devices of a foreign intelligence service. You are in their country. They control it. Even in countries with a long democratic tradition, the local intelligence/security services can control much of your environment – it is to their benefit.

What should I be cautious of while traveling in a foreign country?

Foreign Intelligence Services have been known to do the following:

• Surveil your movements 
• Surreptitiously enter your hotel room or other quarters at will 
• Tap your telephone and fax machine 
• Arrange audio and video coverage of your hotel room, conference room, dining facilities, and in some cases, local restaurants 
• Monitor your conversations and behavior through interpreters and tour guides 
• “Bug” selected seats of national airlines 
• Download information from your laptop computer or other electronic information devices
  These intrusions can be as extensive as the foreign intelligence service’s determination to learn about you while you are in their country.

Who is Most Likely to Be Targeted?

Some factors that increase the possibility that you, or any other person, will be targeted and assessed include:

• Your access to information, people, or places of active intelligence interest 
• Overseas locations where foreign intelligence operatives can gain access to you on the home turf 
• Work in a position or geographic location in the U.S. where it is easy for foreign nationals to gain access to you 
• Ethnic, racial, or religious background that may attract the attention of a foreign intelligence operative

It is important to note that all the above factors that increase the chances of a person selected or initial targeting and assessment are circumstances you have little or no control over.
Most foreign contacts are perfectly legitimate and well meaning. Your ability to recognize the few who are not will help you avoid problems. It will also help your  facility security officer help others avoid problems.

Pre-travel briefings inform individuals about what to guard against and what to expect when travelling to sensitive foreign countries. They are important for your personal safety as well as the safety of the information you carry. Your FSO and DCSA field counterintelligence specialist can provide you with helpful tips for making sure that you are keeping yourself safe and protecting the information you hold.

The post-travel debriefing must be completed upon return from your trip, as it allows security personnel to learn from your experiences while on travel, and use that information to enhance the effectiveness of future pre-travel briefings. Because U.S. citizens are often targeted by foreign intelligence services, it is necessary for you to be aware of the tactics used to obtain information. You are required to talk to your FSO about the details of any unusual events encountered while on foreign travel.

As an employee of a CDC, your actions matter. Your attention to counterintelligence concerns and your proactive approach in sharing information with your FSO will determine how well your interests, and our national security, are protected. The more information you have regarding elicitation methods and recruitment precautions the better protected you are against possible foreign intelligence threats.

What are the methods used by foreign intelligence services to obtain information from US travelers?

Elicitation: An effort in which a seemingly normal conversation is contrived to extract information about individuals, their work, and their colleagues.

• Eavesdropping: Gathering information in social environments by listening in on private conversations.
• Bag Operations: Efforts to steal, photograph, or photocopy documents, magnetic media, laptop computers. This could occur in your hotel room, in an airport, in a conference room, or in any other situation where the opportunity presents itself and your materials are vulnerable.
• Electronic Interception: Use of devices to electronically monitor an individual’s use of modern telecommunications, office, hotel, portable telephones, faxes and computers.
• Technical Eavesdropping: Use of audio and visual devices, usually concealed in hotel rooms, restaurants, offices, cars, airplanes.

Be Aware of the Following Recruitment Cycle Frequently Used by Foreign Intelligence Services

Spotting -Assessment –Recruitment- Handling -Termination

• Spotting: Stage of identifying potential intelligence targets.
• Assessment: Learning as much as possible about the targeted individual.
• Recruitment: Choosing a method of recruiting the individual for information, usually using a motivator of some kind such as money, ideology, compromise, or ego.
• Handling: Recruited target begins to provide the intelligence service with classified/sensitive information.
• Termination: When espionage activities come to an end.

What else should I be aware of while traveling?

Here are some additional tips to help you stay safe and keep your information secure while traveling.

• Maintain control of sensitive documents or equipment at all times.
• Do not leave sensitive materials in hotel rooms or hotel safes.
• Limit sensitive discussions.
• If taking an unclassified computer to a foreign country, ensure there is no sensitive, classified, or proprietary information stored on the computer.

You can always contact your FSO or FCIS for additional information and literature about elicitation and the recruitment cycle, and to learn how you can protect yourself and the information you carry while on foreign travel.

Foreign Contacts Contact with individuals of any foreign nationality, either within or outside the scope of your official duties, in which illegal or unauthorized access to classified or otherwise sensitive information is sought, personal concern that you are a target of an attempted exploitation, all close and continuing relationships between cleared individuals and foreign nations need to be communicated with your FSO.

WHAT HAPPENED

WHAT HAPPENED

WHAT HAPPENED

An industrial personnel security clearance, referred to as a PCL, is an administrative determination that an industrial employee is eligible for access to classified information. This determination is based on an investigation, subsequent review of available personal data and a finding that access is clearly consistent with national interests.

A personnel security clearance determination is made by the adjudicative organization with cognizance over the individual.

Only those persons who have a bona fide need-to-know and who possess a personnel security clearance at the same or higher level as the classified information to be disclosed may have access to classified information.

An individual may be processed for a personnel security clearance when employed by a cleared contractor in a job requiring access to classified information. As an exception, a candidate for employment may be processed for a personnel security clearance provided a written commitment for employment has been made by the contractor, and the candidate has accepted the offer in writing. The commitment for employment will indicate that employment shall commence within 30 days of the granting of eligibility for a PCL.

No. However, under rare circumstances, a non-U.S. citizen may be issued a Limited Access Authorization for access to classified information. Specific criteria and limitations are provided in the . You may also contact your IS Rep for additional information.

No. The individual must have both the appropriate level of personnel security clearance and a need-to-know for the classified information.

No. This authority is reserved by the Government.

Generally speaking, a personnel security clearance remains in effect as long as the individual remains continuously employed by the cleared contractor and can reasonably be expected to require access to classified information. To preclude excessive clearances, the Facility Security Officer should continually review the number of employees with the personnel security clearances and reduce the number of clearances whenever possible.

Individuals cannot apply for a personnel security clearance application on their own. Rather, the company determines whether an employee will require access to classified information in performance of tasks or services related to the fulfillment of a classified contract. Once the company makes this determination, the individual may be processed for a security clearance. The company determines the positions that require a security clearance, as well as the level required, based upon the duties and responsibilities of each position. This determination is based on contractual needs and requirements.

The purpose of a security clearance is to determine whether a person is able and willing to safeguard classified national security information, based on his or her loyalty, character, trustworthiness, and reliability.

The kind, or type, of investigation conducted depends on the access level that the individual is required to have to perform his or her official duties. For access to CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET information, a National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit Check (NACLC) is completed. For access to TOP SECRET or Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) information, a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) is required.

There are three levels of security clearance, with the highest level being TOP SECRET. SECRET is the next level of clearance and CONFIDENTIAL is the lowest level. In addition, some classified information has extra protection measures applied such as SCI and Special Access Programs (SAP). Special approval must be given to have access to this information. For Official Use Only is not a security classification. It is used to protect information covered under the Privacy Act and other sensitive data.

A clearance allows a person filling a specific position to have access to classified national security information up to and including the level of clearance that they hold, so long as the person has a need to know for the information to perform his or her duties.

The Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information are used by DoD Central Adjudication Facilities (DoDCAF) to determine both initial and continued eligibility for access to classified information. The adjudication process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. All available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, is considered in reaching a clearance determination. When an individual’s life history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness, questions arise whether the individual can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working in a secure environment where protection of classified information is paramount.

An individual whose security clearance has been denied or revoked by a central adjudication facility has the opportunity to appeal the decision. The process for doing so differs between military and civilian personnel and contractors. Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, prescribes the process for military and civilian personnel. Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, outlines the process for contractors.
For contractor personnel, the denial, revocation and appeal process is the responsibility of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). The individual may request a hearing before a DOHA administrative judge in order to provide additional, relevant information and will have the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Upon completion of the hearing, the administrative judge will render a decision. If the decision is to deny or revoke the security clearance, the individual has the opportunity to appeal the decision to the Appeal Board. The Appeal Board will review the case file and render its decision. This decision is final and concludes the appeal process.

At the conclusion of the appeal process, an individual whose security clearance has been denied or revoked may reapply for a security clearance for one year from the date of the final decision. The individual may reapply through his or her employing activity if there is a need for access to classified information. The individual is responsible for providing documentation that the circumstances or conditions which resulted in the denial or revocation have been rectified or sufficiently mitigated to warrant reconsideration. The central adjudication facility may accept or reject the reapplication.

Per USDI  the FSO should submit the Top Secret periodic reinvestigation request on the 6th anniversary of the investigation close date found in JPAS.  Periodic reinvestigation should be submitted every 10 years for a SECRET level clearance and every 15 years for a CONFIDENTIAL level clearance.

The most common areas of delay include the submission of incomplete security application packages, poorly collected fingerprints and investigations that involve coverage of extensive overseas activities. Individuals can help expedite the process by ensuring they have completed all forms in a thorough and accurate manner; familiarizing themselves with the appearance of a , to ensure they are recorded properly; and when possible, providing stateside references that can verify foreign activities.reliability.

NISPOM Paragraph 3-105 requires that an individual issued an initial personnel security clearance (PCL) execute a Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (SF-312) prior to being granted access to classified information and that the completed form is forwarded to the Cognizant Security Agency for retention. The Facility Security Officer (FSO) is responsible for annotating the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) with the date the SF-312 was executed and submitting the completed SF-312 to Vetting Risk Operations Center (VROC) for retention. The new, preferred method of transmission is via fax, this allows for a more expedient entry into our systems. SF-312s should be faxed or mailed: Fax Number: (443)661-1140 ATTN: SF-312 If using the fax method, please include the following information on the cover letter:

• FSO Name
• FSO Phone Number
• FSO Fax Number
• FSO Email Address
• Subject Name
• Subject SSN

Fax Address: . When using the email option, password protect the file in the first email and send the actual password in a separate email.

.

A lot of detailed information is required to conduct a background investigation. Information such as complete names, addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of birth for relatives will be required. The form the clearance applicant completes is online and permits information to be gathered even after the individual completes and submits the form. When periodic updates are required, the applicant will only need to update information that has changed since the initial submission. If the applicant would like to preview the type of information that will be required, access the and begin collecting information so it will be available when needed.

The company Facility Security Officer (FSO) should be the first contact for assistance in completing a security clearance package or to inquire into the status of a security clearance. The is also available.

DoDCAF began conducting 4th Estate SCI determinations effective date was July 1, 2016. Nominations submitted prior to the effective date of July 1, 2016, will be adjudicated by the DIA. However, any cases already in the DIA inventory that were already adjudicated by the DoD CAF for Top Secret were transferred back to the DoD CAF for SCI adjudication.

DoDCAF began conducting 4th Estate SCI determinations effective date was July 1, 2016. Nominations submitted prior to the effective date of July 1, 2016, will be adjudicated by the DIA. However, any cases already in the DIA inventory that were already adjudicated by the DoD CAF for Top Secret were transferred back to the DoD CAF for SCI adjudication.

Per the NISPOM, DoD5220.22M, 2-205. Pre-employment Clearance Action. If access to classified information is required by a potential employee immediately upon commencement of their employment, a PCL application may be submitted to the Cognizant Security Agency by the contractor prior to the date of employment provided a written commitment for employment has been made by the contractor, and the candidate has accepted the offer in writing. The commitment for employment will indicate that employment shall commence within 30 days of the granting of eligibility for a PCL. When filling out the Standard Form (SF) 86, Employment History, Section 13, it requires individuals to provide ONLY current and previous work location addresses and supervisor names, addresses, and contact information — ‘NOT Future Employment’. The National Background Investigations Bureau provides six tips to filling out the SF-86, Employment History, Section 13: 1.List ALL beginning with the present and back 10 full years with no breaks. No job is too short or insignificant to list. 2.Do NOT list tentative or future employments. 3.Do not stretch employment dates to fill gaps when you were really unemployed for a month or more. 4.Provide the physical work location. 5.Whether or not you agree, if the employer would say that you were fired, terminated, or left under unfavorable circumstances, list and explain. 6.Discipline, warnings, reprimands, etc. – If you received one, list it (Verbal, written, formal, and informal, etc.)

The non-DoD agency can email VROC directly, providing the subject’s first and last name and CAGE code at to verify CE enrollment.

VROC actively monitors the age of the investigation request inventory and is diligently processing Investigation Requests in the order in which the request was received. Your patience and understanding is greatly appreciated. Please note: While JPAS shows a 90 day expiration clock, the expiration date for e-QIPs was increased from 90 days to 120 days. Therefore, e-QIPs will not expire until they reach negative 30 days (-30) in JPAS.

Critical Priority Requests, or expeditious processing of select investigation requests, are no longer available.

VROC actively monitors the age of the investigation request inventory and is diligently processing Investigation Requests in the order in which the request was received. An interim determination will be made once the investigation is scheduled and advanced products are returned to VROC by the Investigation Service Provider (ISP). Your patience and understanding is greatly appreciated. A process flow outlining this and other PCL activities associated with obtaining a security clearance for Industry is provided here for your ease of reference. DoD policy requires the following for an Interim Secret to be granted:

Favorable review of the SF-86
• Favorable fingerprint check
• Proof of U.S. citizenship
• Favorable review of local records, if applicable

For Tier 3, Tier 3 R and Tier 5 requests – a new investigation request must be initiated, and the employee must re-answer the lifestyle yes/no questions and update any information that has changed since the original submission. Once you have submitted the new request to DCSA and it is showing Ready for Review/Approval, please contact the DCSA Knowledge Center at 1-888-282-7682, Option #2. Note: Also answer question #5, concerning fingerprint check expiration, if applicable. For Tier 5 R requests – At this time, please do not submit/resubmit for Top Secret reinvestigation unless the requisite SAP Caveat criteria is met and clearly identified as described here. If the Tier 5 R request is for SAP Caveat, please follow the Tier 3, Tier 3 R and Tier 5 guidance provided above.

Electronic fingerprints should be submitted at the same time or just before an investigation request is released to DCSA in JPAS. You can confirm NBIB has processed the fingerprints by checking the Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII) in JPAS which indicates a SAC closed. Fingerprint results are valid for 120 days, the same amount of time for which e-QIP signature pages are valid. Therefore, submitting electronic fingerprints at the same time or just before you complete your review for adequacy and completeness should prevent an investigation request from being rejected for missing fingerprints. A flow outlining this and other PCL activities associated with obtaining a security clearance for Industry is provided here for your ease of reference, and Step #2 outlines the submission activities. Note: If fingerprints are submitted well before an employee certifies their investigation request, it is possible the fingerprints could expire. Please monitor the date of the fingerprint (SAC) result and submit a new set of fingerprints should the SAC exceed 120 days.

You can obtain an investigation status update by performing a search of the Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII) in JPAS. This link is available at the bottom of the Person Summary Screen in JPAS (Perform SII Search). The following statuses are available to let you know what is happening with the investigation: Received — The Investigation Service Provider has acknowledged receipt of the investigation request and will be reviewing for acceptability. Unacceptable — The Investigation Service Provider determined the investigation request to be deficient. VROC will transmit a JPAS message with the reason the request was rejected. If your employee still requires a clearance, a new investigation request will need to be initiated and submitted with the corrected information. Scheduled — The Investigation Service Provider has determined the investigation request to be acceptable and the investigation is current ongoing/open. Closed — The Investigative Service Provider has completed the investigation and the investigation has been sent for adjudication. Case Action (CA) Considered — The CA Considered in SII indicates that the case is closed pending leads at NBIB. Once the investigation is closed it will be sent to the DoD CAF for adjudication. DISS/JVS will be updated once the adjudication process is complete. The Knowledge Center will no longer provide lead count and does not have the ability to estimate nor impact investigation timelines.

The DoD Continuous Evaluation (CE) program is an ongoing screening process to review the background of an individual who is assigned to a sensitive position or has access to classified information. CE leverages automated record checks and applies business rules (aligned to the Federal Investigative Standards) to assist in the ongoing assessment of an individual’s continued eligibility.The DoD Continuous Evaluation (CE) program is an ongoing screening process to review the background of an individual who is assigned to a sensitive position or has access to classified information. CE leverages automated record checks and applies business rules (aligned to the Federal Investigative Standards) to assist in the ongoing assessment of an individual’s continued eligibility.

Deferment refers to the process implemented by DoD, in July 2018, and currently being used by departments and agencies to permit the focus of investigative resources on the inventory of pending initial investigations. New reinvestigation requests are screened using a risk management based approach, where the Standard Form 86 (SF-86) is analyzed using deferment protocol(s) and is identified for either enrollment in Continuous Evaluation (CE) or submission to an Investigation Service Provider (ISP) for a reinvestigation. This process was authorized by both the Director of National Intelligence, in his capacity as the Security Executive Agent, and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in his capacity as the Suitability & Credentialing Executive Agent, through the issuance of the June 2018 memorandum Transforming Workforce Vetting: Measures to Reduce the Federal Government’s Background Investigation Inventory in Fiscal Year 2018.

Yes. You are still required to submit a completed SF 86 and the reinvestigation request, six years from the date of last investigation for T5Rs (in accordance with January 2017 guidance) and ten years from the date of the last reinvestigation for T3Rs.

Yes.

Yes; for specific requirements appropriate references can be found in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum, Supplemental Guidance for Reciprocity of Background Investigations and National Security Adjudications, dated October 22, 2019. A copy of the above memorandum is located on page 3 of this document for ease of reference.

No. National policy and DoD policies mandate the reciprocal acceptance of deferred investigations.

Yes, personnel preforming on contracts for NISP signatories are included.

Yes. Vetting Risk Operations Center (VROC) will send a Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) message advising when the Subject’s investigation has been stopped in JPAS and the Subject has been enrolled in CE. We ask that facility security officers inform any subjects deferred of their status, so that in the event they transfer to new employment, their new security manager can verify their deferment status directly, via the procedures identified in the answer to Question #9, vice submitting a new PR. The Department of Defense (DoD) Continuous Evaluation (CE) enrollment history records are also now visible in the Defense Information Security System (DISS). The CE enrollment history will display the CE enrollment reason Code and the date of the enrollment or dis-enrollment into the DoD’s CE program. Any DISS user with general access will be able to see this information on The subject’s summary page.

To confirm PR deferment status, log into DISS and review the Continuous Evaluation section under the Basic Info tab. If your subject is enrolled in CE, the summary will reveal their enrollment history. The CE enrollment history will display the CE enrollment reason code and the date of the enrollment or dis-enrollment into the DoD’s CE program. Valid enrollment reasons displayed in CE history section of DISS – Deferred Investigation: the individual was enrolled into the CE program based on deferment of a reinvestigation – Other: the individual was enrolled as part of the overall DoD effort to enroll eligible civilian, military and industry personnel with a national security clearance into the DoD CE program – Unenrolled: the individual is no longer enrolled into the DoD’s CE program If your subject is not enrolled, the summary will remain blank and state No records found. This individual has not ever been enrolled into the DoD’s CE program.

VROC reviews submitted SF-86s and any unresolved incident report for potential adjudicative relevance. For security reasons, specific criteria cannot be shared.

PRs are still required to be submitted on all individuals who have not had a PR deferment. The previously closed investigation date will be used to determine when the PR will be submitted. Though future state requirements may require the use of the CE enrollment date to determine when to submit an SF86 on an individual who has had a PR deferment, no PR deferred individuals will be within a window requiring a PR request until at least August 2023. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence signed a memorandum on December 7, 2016, Personnel Security Clearances in Industry, reminding DoD Components that personnel security clearances do not expire. Individuals with current eligibility in JPAS, or its successor system, should not be denied access based solely on an out-of-scope investigation. A copy of the above memorandum is located on page 5 of this document for ease of reference. If you encounter any challenges with this process, please email